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AGENCY, STEWARDSHIP AND THE UNIVERSAL-FAMILY FIRM:  
A QUALITATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces the idea of a non-kinship-based Universal-family firm, an 
organizational form we developed based on interpreting historical writings in their 
socio-HFRQRPLFFRQWH[W:HDQDO\]HG/XNH¶VJRVSHOZLWKDQH\HWRZDUGGUDZLQJ
implications for the stewardship-agency debate in the contemporary family business 
literature. Our paper makes contributions at two important levels. In addition to 
introducing and developing theory about the Universal-family firms, we also 
contribute to the methodological toolkit of family business scholars by providing a 
template for using historical documents to challenge, enhance and develop theory.  
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Sometimes our dominant conceptual frameworks and ways of seeing unintentionally 
serve to become ways of not seeing (Poggi, 1965), and we become encaptured in a socially-
constructed reality that we have inherited and that we unwittingly perpetuate (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). Although such frameworks are necessary for us to develop richer 
understanding and theory, it is also helpful to step outside of established conceptual boxes and 
look at phenomena from new perspectives. Among scholars, such stepping outside is typically 
facilitated by observing empirical phenomena that do not seem to fit within existing theories, 
as is happening today in the world of physics where findings consistent with quantum 
mechanics (e.g., with regard to wave-particle duality) are upending long-held assumptions 
consistent with the Newtonian classical world (e.g., Kim et al., 2000). 
 This paper represents one small such an instance of stepping outside, and describes its 
implications for family business generally, and for the agency-stewardship debate within the 
family business literature specifically. In particular, this paper will introduce and develop the 
concept we call the Universal-family firm, which is an organizational form that we believe 
exists in the empirical world, is timely for issues facing contemporary scholars and 
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practitioners, and is especially relevant for the agency-stewardship debate within family 
business research. As we shall see, the Universal-family firm describes a type of family firm 
that²paradoxically²is not based on a kinship ties. What do family firms look like if their 
definition is not based on blood-lines? 
 Our review of the literature suggests that, whilst the long history of family firms may 
implicitly lead scholars to see this kinship-based organizational form as somehow timeless, 
wholesome, and noble, nevertheless this organizational form has also been long-criticized, 
and attempts have been made to address its shortcomings. We then introduce an overarching 
two-dimensional framework related to the agency-stewardship debate in family business. 
Next, we briefly look DW$ULVWRWOH¶VZULWLQgs relevant to agency and stewardship in the family 
firm, which provide a context for our analysis of the Gospel of Luke. We subsequently 
present the method and context for our analysis. This includes setting out the historical 
understanding of family firm systems, norms and structures in the world of the Graeco-
Roman Mediterranean, focusing on the primary goods and services producing organization of 
the day, the oikos ² or what today might be called a family-in-business. We then examine an 
especially relevant biblical text²the so-called ³Central Section´ RI/XNH¶V*RVSHO²to 
explore what it says about the family-in-business, paying special attention to its contribution 
for understanding of the universal family-in-business in the light of modern discussion around 
stewardship and agency. In our final Discussion  we provide historical and contemporary 
examples of Universal-family firms, discuss implications for agency and stewardship theory, 
and present the key components for building theory related to the Universal-family firm.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
For most of the history of humankind, the oikos²DIRUHUXQQHURIWRGD\¶VIDPLO\
firm²was the primary form of a goods and services producing organization. Aristotle 
provides perhaps the most influential early analysis of the oikos, which continued to change 
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and evolve through Roman times, the Middle Ages, and through to the present. In particular 
there has been an on-going debate concerning issues related to what contemporary family 
firm scholars would call stewardship (the potentially positive characteristics of family firms 
associated with their more communal, long-term and altruistic nature) versus agency (the 
potentially exploitive and nepotistic character of family firms). 0DGLVRQHWDO¶VUHYLHZ
15), for example, contrasts inter alia DJHQF\WKHRU\¶VHFRQRPLFEehavioral assumptions with 
WKHPRUHKXPDQLVWLFVWHZDUGVKLSDVVXPSWLRQVDJHQF\¶VJRYHUQDQFHHPSKDVLVRQLQFHQWLYHV
DQGPRQLWRULQJZLWKVWHZDUGVKLS¶VWUXVWDQGHPSRZHUPHQWDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLVWLFDQGIUHH-
riding behaviors of agency, with the other-serving, pro-organizational behaviors of 
stewardship (2016, 15).   
Agency and stewardship theory. Agency theory starts with the assumption that people 
are self-interested and prone to acting opportunistically (e.g., Barney & Hesterly, 1999). In 
particular, agency theory tends to focus on the (contractual) relationship between a business¶V 
owners (principals) and its managers (agents) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency 
literature on non-family firms focuses on designing principal-agent contracts such that the 
incentives for DILUP¶Vmanagers coincide with the outcomes sought by its owners. In this 
regard, family firms are thought to enjoy a relative advantage because owners and managers 
are often one-and-the-same, which automatically aligns manager-owner interests and thus 
reduces IDPLO\ILUPV¶agency-based risks and costs (e.g., the costs of designing and 
monitoring principal-agent contracts) (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Of course, this is not to say that agency theory is irrelevant for family firms. Typically, 
when (behavioral) agency theory is applied to family firms, it focuses on how managers in 
family firms may sacrifice WKHLUILUP¶Veconomic performance in order to preserve the 
socioemotional wealth that their family derives from the business (Madison et al, 2016; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2014; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). For example, 
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consider firms that have multiple owners, but where one family has ownership control. Such a 
family can exploit smaller owners by entrenching its family members in key positions and 
appropriating resources from the business to pursue benefits for its family members (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009, p. 1172). Such agentic actions may serve the interests of the 
dominant family at the expense of the long-term overall performance of the firm (cf. Bertrand 
& Schoar, 2006;  
Demsetz, 1983; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Morck et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Stewardship theory relaxes the assumptions of economic self-interest and 
opportunism, and suggests that people are also motivated to serve others and to be generous 
and altruistic (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2009; Le Breton-Miller, Miller & Lester, 2011). Scholars tend to argue that 
stewardship practices are more likely to be evident in family firms than in non-family firms 
(see, for example, Aronoff & Ward, 1995; Wade-Benzoni, 2002; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; 
Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007). ,QWRGD\¶VPDUNHWSODFHZKHUHORQJ-term social and 
ecological considerations are increasingly valued, these aspects inherent in family firms seem 
to give them a relative advantage over non-family firms (Eddleston et al., 2012, pp. 249-250). 
At least five factors explain why family firms place relatively high emphasis on stewardship:  
1) interpersonal relationships within family firms often have characteristics associated 
with stewardship, including stability, significant interaction and interdependence, and 
a shared social network (Le Breton-Miller et al, 2011; Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998);  
 
2) family firms tend to place greater value on the firm¶s relational and socioemotional 
value and identity (hallmarks of stewardship) than non-kinship firms (Le Breton-
Miller, 2009; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007);  
 
3) owners of a family firm tend to have a longer term commitment to their firm (e.g., 
in terms of jobs and income for future generations) than owners of non-kinship firms 
(thus, for example, family firms are more willing to make a short-term sacrifice if it 
HQKDQFHVWKHILUP¶VORQJ-term well-being; Le Breton-Miller et al, 2011);  
 
4) owners of a family firm are more likely to perceive their personal reputations to be 
enhanced by their firm engaging in stewardship activities than are owners of non-
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kinship firm (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003); and 
 
5) family firms are more likely to be inherently moral, due to the shared identification 
of their members with core cultural values (Blodgett et al., 2011, p. 35; Haugh & 
McKee, 2003, p. 141; Payne et al, 2011; Vallejo 2008, p. 271), their enhanced socio-
emotional wealth (Hauswald & Hack, 2013, p. 361), and often shared religious 
convictions (James, 2006; Le Breton-Miller, 2009, p. 1182; Lungeanu & Ward, 2012, 
p. 409; Vallejo, 2008, p. 263).   
 
Value creation vs value capture: Towards an organizational typology 
 The distinction between value capture versus value creation²which is becoming key 
in the strategy literature (e.g., Santos, 2012)²is helpful for enriching our understanding of 
differences between agency and stewardship. Value creation is measured at a societal level of 
DQDO\VLVDQGLVHYLGHQW³ZKHQWKHDJJUHJDWH XWLOLW\RIVRFLHW\¶s members increases after 
accounting for the opportunity cost of all the resources used in that DFWLYLW\´6DQWRVS 
337). For example, value creation occurs when a firm uses resources in a new way that 
provides more benefit for more people than had been the case without the firm. To remain 
viable in the long-term, all firms need to create value at the societal level. In contrast, value 
capture occurs at a smaller unit of analysis (e.g., a firm, agents within a firm), and is evident 
³when a focal actor is able to appropriate a portion of the value created by the activity [of a 
firm] after accounting for the cost of resouUFHVWKDWKHVKH>WKHILUP@PRELOL]HG´6DQWRV
2012, p. 337). At the firm level, profit is a common measure of value capture. Value capture 
can also take place within a firm, and is evident in differing proportions of value appropriated, 
for example, by men versus women, executives versus front-line workers, engineers versus 
marketers, and, in family firms, family members versus non-family members. Some form of 
value creation and value capture must be evident in all viable firms; though, as depicted along 
the horizontal dimension in Figure 1, firms may place differing emphases on these two. Along 
the vertical dimension of Figure 1 we see that organizations may, or may not be, kinship-
based firms. Of course, as with other typologies, most firms are between the two extremes of 
value capture and value creation, and there are many shades of grey between being wholly 
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kinship-based versus non-kinship-based firms.  
- Insert figure 1 about here -  
In terms of the four quadrants in Figure 1, ³Conventional firms´ refer to (non-family) 
firms that seek to maximize organizational profits, and assume that actors are motivated and 
will take advantage of opportunities to enhance their own financial self-interests (consistent 
with agency theory). This quadrant encompasses much of the mainstream business literature. 
For example, the strategy literature shows how firms can and should seek to take advantage of 
their relative advantages vis a vis competitors, suppliers and customers (e.g., Porter¶V[1980] 5 
forces) and how, at a societal level, firms should take advantage of externalities such as 
seeking to pay lower taxes, reduce costs for employee benefits, minimize pollution clean-up 
expenses, and so on. Within the firm, precautions need to be taken to ensure that members 
will act in the interests of owners, rather than in their self-interests.  
³Agentic family firms´ are those where a focal kinship family seeks to maximize 
value capture for itself (as opposed to for the overall firm and/or other stakeholders). In a 
sense, agentic families seek not only to capture the value creation of the firm in the larger 
marketplace (akin to conventional firms), but also seek to capture a disproportionate share of 
the value within the firm. This can be dysfunctional in the long-term for a variety of reasons: 
1) it has a negative effect on the loyalty and the work effort of non-family members; 2) it 
distracts attention away from ensuring long-term value creation in society; and 3) it siphons 
resources away from investments to enhance the long-term financial performance of the firm. 
The third quadrant, ³Stewardship family firms,´ are those who focus on value creation 
EH\RQGWKHIDPLO\WRLQFOXGHDOOWKHILUP¶VVWDNHKROGHUV:KLOHWKLVPD\OLPLWWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
for the family to maximize its value capture in the short-term (versus the Agentic family 
firm), the typical implicit assumption is that this ZLOOHQKDQFHWKHILUP¶VYDOXHFDSWXUHLQWKH
long-term. This Stewardship approach to long-term value creation places greater emphasis on 
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non-financial measures of value than is evident in Agentic family firms. Family firms in the 
Stewardship quadrant value their reputation and their relationships with key stakeholders. 
Thus, these firms will relax the short-term actions such as those associDWHGZLWK3RUWHU¶V
(1980) five forces, and will proactively internalize some of the externalities associated with 
their activities (e.g., voluntarily offer benefits to their employees). Again, this should bode 
well for improving the long-term value-capture-ability for Stewardship family firms in a 
marketplace that is placing greater emphasis on addressing socio-environmental problems. 
However, note that even the Stewardship family firm is seeking to benefit primarily the 
kinship family and its related stakeholders, perhaps sometimes at the expense of other 
(needier) societal groups. 
The fourth quadrant, ³Universal-family firms,´ represents an organizational ideal-type 
that emphasizes aspects of stewardship and value creation that have been associated with 
family firms, while avoiding agentic and exploitive tendencies that have been associated with 
formal kinship ties of blood or law. It is a universal family firm in that, even though its 
members are not related to each other by blood, it is characterized by having other-focused, 
inclusive, long- term relational qualities typically associated with family firms, plus an 
emphasis on socio-emotional wealth that goes beyond WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVWDNHKROGHUV. Such 
firms are increasingly hinted at, discussed and called for in the literature, but not often 
examined empirically. Notable exceptions include research on social enterprises, Benefit 
Corporations, the fourth sector, hybrid organizations, humanistic management, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility (e.g., André, 2012; Battiliana et al., 2012; Davis, 2013; Gaffney, 2012; 
Von Kimakowitz et al., 2010). However, as others have noted, this type may be difficult to 
sustain because of market forces and institutional norms (e.g., Santos, 2012). For example, 
Corporate Social Responsibility often gets co-opted by the value capture paradigm (Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003). Such co-optation leaves unharvested a vast field of value creation 
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opportunities for potential Universal-family firms (e.g., the kinds of opportunities that create 
value for marginalized members of society but do not maximize a firm¶s ability to capture 
financial value). For example, Bill Gates describes why millions of children die because they 
lack medicine that costs less than one dollar per person: ³The answer is simple, and harsh. 
The market did not reward the saviQJWKHOLYHVRIWKHVHFKLOGUHQ´ (Gates, 2007: not 
paginated). Universal-family firms are more likely to seek opportunities to serve such needs. 
As will become evident in our findings, Universal-family firms are of particular importance in 
the Gospel of Luke. 
History and the family firm 
 The appeal of family firms is often set out in terms which laud their more natural 
traditional nature; an idealistic past embodied in business form (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2011, p. 
243). Perhaps paradoxically, contemporary family business scholars often forget that 
variations of family business have been the dominant form of goods and services producing 
organizations for most of the history of humankind. Yet if their place in the historical tradition 
is part of what makes family firms so special, resonant, and appealing²individually and 
collectively²then it is also relevant to engage with historical readings of the family-in-
business. This is echoed in calls for scholars to pay more nuanced attention to the inherent 
heterogeneity of family firms across contexts (Sharma et al., 2012, p. 10; Gupta & Levenburg, 
2010, p. 166; James et al, 2012, pp. 87-88). Indeed, as Andrea Colli has argued: 
³$VWKHnotion of the family itself has evolved over time, family values and goals²
including the economic ones²have also been subject to a process of transformation. 
Here, too, historical research based on primary sources can help highlight not only the 
role of family values in driving entrepreneurial choices but also the transformations in 
LGHRORJLFDOIUDPHZRUNVFDXVHGE\FKDQJHVLQWKHSUHYDLOLQJFXOWXUH´S 
 
In general terms, we hope to contribute to what might be called a History of Family 
Firm Analysis by exploring some significant, traditional origins of the family-in-business 
heritage. We have chosen biblical writings because of the influence of the Christian heritage 
 9 
on (especially Western) society. With about one-third of the world claiming to adhere to it, 
Christianity is the largest religion in the world, and Christian writings have played an 
important role in the scholarly development of modern ideas about capitalism and business, as 
illustrated by the enormous influHQFHRI0D[:HEHU¶VThe Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism. $V'UDNRSRXORX'RGGDQG*RWVLVSKDYHDUJXHG³Christianity and 
enterprise have been linked so repeatedly, in such a variety of ways, that a study of their very 
earliest reODWLRQVKLSLVDZRUWKZKLOHH[HUFLVHLQLWVRZQULJKW´ 
Our study explores narratives about management, organization, and family in the 
Gospel of Luke, which was likely written in about 80-$'DERXW\HDUVDIWHU-HVXV¶
crucifixion). The author we refer to as Luke is recognized as the most cosmopolitan and 
educated of the four gospel authors, writing in the lingua franca of the day, Koine Greek, 
whilst also clearly echoing the Hebrew Old Testament, and Ancient Greek philosophical and 
historical writings/XNH¶V*RVSHOUHIHUVWRRYHUJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVSURGXFLQJ
organizations (oikoi), and it contains the majority of mentions of management, organization, 
wealth, and stewardship found in all four Gospels (see Dyck, 2013, which we draw from and 
build upon extensively in this paper). More specifically, our examination will focus on what 
scholars call the Central Section of Gospel (Luke 9:51-19:40). Also known as The Journey 
Narrative, Luke sets the Central Section in the context of Jesus and his disciples making the 
transition from their preaching in Galilee, to the climactic events to transpire in Jerusalem. 
More importantly, the section has about 75 percent of the mentions and discourse within 
/XNH¶V*RVSHOWKDWUHODWHWRPDQDJHPHQWDQGIDPLO\EXVLQHVV²and what it says about the 
tension between stewardship versus agency. 
Relevant Ideas in the Historical Literature: Building on the Shoulders of Aristotle 
Before we turn our focus to the Gospel of Luke, it is appropriate to briefly situate it 
within its context. If Luke had started his Gospel with a literature review summarizing key 
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theory in the field of oikos studies, it would have included issues similar to those being 
discussed in the contemporary literature regarding stewardship and agency theory, and value 
capture and value creation. Perhaps most notable is Aristotle, whose writings provide a basis 
for developing WKH6WHZDUGVKLSIDPLO\TXDGUDQW7KLVLVHYLGHQWLQ$ULVWRWOH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI
two approaches to chrematistics, a term that essentially refers to the management of money in 
goods and services producing organizations. Aristotle suggests that ³natural chrematistics´ 
³VXVWHQDQFHHFRQRPLFV,´ Dyck & Neubert, 2010) emphasizes the use value of money to 
facilitate overall value creation for the community (everyone wins). He contrasts this with 
³unnatural chrematistics,´³DFTXLVLWLYHHFRQRPLFV´ which emphasizes the exchange value of 
money and treats it as a rent-seeking commodity, so that money becomes a measure of value 
capture, and thereby deflects attention away from value creation. Aristotle lamented that some 
people were being led to believe that increasing financial wealth was the purpose of managing 
goods and services producing organizations, and as a result   
³the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without 
limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men [sic?] is that 
they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are 
unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit´
(Aristotle, Politics: Book I, IX; emphasis added here). 
 
 Karl Polanyi (1944, pp. 53-54; see Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2009) has suggested that 
$ULVWRWOH¶VGLVWLQFWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKese two approaches to managing money within goods and 
VHUYLFHVSURGXFLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQV³ZDVSUREDEO\WKHPRVWSURSKHWLFSRLQWHUHYHUPDGHLQWKH 
UHDOPRIWKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHV´DQG³FHUWDLQO\VWLOOWKHEHVWDQDO\VLVRIWKHVXEMHFWZH SRVVHVV´ 
METHODOLOGY 
Our methodological approach²which includes a combination of biblical theology, 
linguistic analysis, redaction criticism, and socio-economic history²is consistent with and 
builds upon the work of other historians, economists and social scientists who seek to 
interpret the biblical texts in their historical socio-economic and religious context (e.g., Dodd 
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& Gotsis, 2009; Dyck, 2013; Elliott, 1991; Hanson & Oakman, 1998; Kloppenborg, 2008; 
Malina & Rohrbaugh, 2003; Moxnes, 1988). Consistent with biblical scholarship, we engage 
in detailed textual analyses and draw on knowledge of the ancient languages implicated in the 
specific text (such as New Testament Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic), as well as of rhetorical 
structures of the day, of the nature of metaphor, analogy and other devices. Evidence from the 
archaeological record is additionally drawn upon, where relevant (e.g., Reed, 2007). Also 
deployed are comparisons with related contemporaneous works, including other sections of 
the New Testament, for example. Earlier potential influences on the text in question are also 
considered, especially from the Judaic tradition, other Levantine religions, and Greek 
SKLORVRSK\ZHKDYHSUHVHQWHG$ULVWRWOH¶VZRUNDVDn example of such influences).  
This background knowledge is essential for exegesis, namely the interpretation of 
/XNH¶VWH[WLQLWVKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W+RZHYHUHYHQZKHQexegesis work is done properly, 
interpreters must be conscious of eisgesis, which refers to bringing their own presuppositions 
and biases into a text. A particular tendency ± and, indeed, an understandable one ± is for a 
WH[W¶V words to be read as though they had been written in the here and now, to strip them of 
their historical, cultural and geographic context, and to imSRVHWKHUHDGHU¶VLQVWHDG 
 Our study involved detailed analysis of /XNH¶V&HQWUDO6HFWLRQLuke 9:51-19:40), 
with both co-authors separately carrying out original (re-)examinations of this text and 
highlighting passages of special relevance for our main interest in family, management, and 
the related topics of socio-economic ethics, assets, and authority. Special attention was paid to 
the practices enacted and depicted within this narrative, and to the importance of the context 
within which the parables, stories, and other discourse, were originally set. To reduce further 
the potential dangers of eisgesis associated with specific biblical translations, one author 
worked from the New Testament Greek text of the Central Sections (considering all extant 
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variants), and both explored multiple English language translations, as well as detailed 
commentaries of the key passages discussed below (e.g., Marshall, 1978).  
 After relevant passages had been identified and studied in detail, our analyses were 
compared, contrasted, and debated. We also continued to draw iteratively, throughout the 
process, on theological analysis, and much detailed reading of extant Lucan scholarship 
among the social sciences. This hermeneutic and historical scholarship led to a critical 
reading, an exegesisRIWKH&HQWUDO6HFWLRQ¶VIDPLO\-in-management discourse. The novelty in 
our study stems from the identification and collation of family business related excerpts in 
this text, and their analysis as a related body of work.  
 µ2LNRV¶ ± The Historical Family-in-Business 
 A historical understanding of the Greek word oikos²a term that of its very essence 
combines both business and family²represents an important key for unlocking what Luke 
and other writers of his temporal context say about family-based goods and services 
producing organizations. The word oikos is usually translated into English as ³house,´ but this 
invites two eisgetical problems in interpretation because today the term house is typically 
associated with (1) oQH¶VQXFOHDUIDPLO\HJtypically parent and child) and (2) being a 
consumptive social unit (e.g., people earn their livelihoods by working outside of the house). 
Both these contemporary understandings of house contrast strongly with the understanding of 
oikos throughout most of the history of humankind. 
 First, consistent with contemporary understandings, at the center of the classic oikos 
are two parents and their children. However, the oikos also included its slaves, any free 
servants, their children, other dependent kin, and its physical assets. Indeed, even though the 
emotional ties of the nuclear family were clearly of great importance in ancient times (Saller 
& Shaw, 1984), at that time there was no term, no word or concept which conveyed what we 
mean by family, and especially what today is meant by the nuclear family (Rawson, 2011, p. 
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3). Second, the oikos was the primary goods and services producing organizational form 
through most of the history of humankind. Any oikos that did not produce goods and services 
was not truly an oikos (e.g., Nagle, 2006). 
 With regard to the modern discussion around issues of stewardship and agency, it is 
key to understand historical norms around the idea of honor, and how it can be achieved via 
financial wealth and patron-client relations. Honor was akin to social capital, which was 
expressed mainly through kinship (belonging), politics (power), and religion (theological 
virtue) (Drakopoulou Dodd & Gotsis, 2009, p. 102; Esler, 2000, p. 13). Patron-client 
relationships refer to relationships between two oikoi of different status, where one oikos (the 
client) has a duty to give honor to a second oikos (the patron) which has provided the client 
with some service (e.g., loaned money, granted a political favor). Actions like borrowing 
money were not one-time transactions; rather, they established long-term (cross-generational) 
patron-client relationships between organizations. Wealth, honor and status were considered a 
property of the oikos, rather than of individuals. Indeed, it has been argued that personal 
identity was essentially tied-up in a social ego, in being part of the wider oikos (Bowen, 1978, 
p. 73; Malina & Neyrey, 1991).   
 The classic Greeks promoted an understanding of oikos that could be considered a 
forerunner to the Stewardship family firms ideal-type (see Figure 1). In Ancient Greece to be 
a patron meant to be a benefactor in the best sense of the term (akin to Old Testament ideas 
about charity and shalom), with a primary duty to improve the lot of the marginalized, or of 
the public good (value creation). It was an open-handed affair, and had little to do with 
µEDQNLQJ¶IDYRUVDQGEXLOGLQJGHSHQGHQFLHV7KLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK$ULVWRWOH¶VSURPRWLRQRI
sustenance economics, where a natural engagement with money and business was one where 
the profit motive came far down the list of objectives, and which involved some form of 
productive economic activity. Wealth enabled the rich to carry out their civic duties, including 
 14 
funding public works and charity, although it could also distract from pursuing the good life 
(Aristotle, 2006; see also Galbraith, 1987, p. 15, Karayiannis, 1992, p. 71). Moreover, the 
then-prevalent zero-sum game worldview of resources meant that (agentic) striving to become 
ULFKHUPXVWDOZD\VEHDWVRPHRQHHOVH¶VH[SHQVHthus widening the gap between rich and 
poor, and thus seen to be immoral (Drakopoulou Dodd & Gotsis, 2009).  
 In contrast, the views of oikos that dominated during the Roman empire could be 
considered forerunners of the Agentic family firm ideal-type (see Figure 1). For the Romans, 
a key purpose of the oikos was to build up long-lasting honor for itself characterized by an 
emphasis on acquisitive economics where the rationale for creating and sustaining socio-
economic patron-client bonds ZDVWRHQKDQFHEHQHILWVWRRQHV¶ own oikos (value capture). By 
the first century honor, status and wealth had become increasingly intertwined (e.g., Neyrey 
& Stewart, 2008), and wealth generation had lost many of its negative connotations among 
the elite. To act honorably was synonymous ZLWKEULQJLQJZHDOWKDQGVWDWXVWRRQH¶Voikos. 
Indeed, any oikos member who provided some sort of benefit to other oikoi was duty-bound 
to ensure that these other oikoi would become clients to the member¶s oikos. Increasing 
financial wealth, and using it to develop self-serving patron-client relationships, had become a 
primary way to enhance the honor of an oikos. This was especially true in larger centers of the 
Roman empire.  
  These changes were playing out in the local socio-FXOWXUDOFRQWH[WRI/XNH¶VGospel. 
As the wealthy were becoming richer in first-century Palestine, they increasingly followed the 
pattern of urbanization evident in the rest of the Roman empire, becoming absentee landlords, 
and leaving the administration of their country estates to managers, who became key members 
of the oikos (Aristotle Politics; Baergen, 2006, p. 33; Goodrich, 2010, p. 82). Indeed, as much 
as eight percent of the population in the first century may have been (non-kin, usually slave) 
managers, often acting to support elite family estates. Also important within the economy 
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were the smaller oikoi of artisans, farmers, fishermen, and traders, whose domestic and 
productive lives were also inextricably joined together into what was sometimes called the 
oikos of the Emperor. In first-century Palestine, however, about ten percent of the population 
did not have the safety net of belonging to an oikos, often because of bankruptcy (e.g., due to 
increasing Roman taxes) or because of illness (e.g., they were outcasts because they were 
considered to be religiously impure) (Dyck, 2013, p. 36). 
 Having set the historical socio-economic context for Luke, we will now explain and 
GLVFXVVZKDW/XNH¶V&HQWUDO6HFWLRQWHOOVXVDERXWWKHIDPLO\-in-business, and consider how 
his writings may shed light on modern analysis of stewardship and agency.  
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
%\ZD\RIRYHUYLHZRXUILQGLQJVZLOOVKRZWKDW/XNH¶V&HQWUDO6HFWLRQKDVPDQ\
counter-cultural implications with regard to the dominant first-century understanding of oikos. 
We will look at each of the following in turn. First, in perhaps his most radical statements²
aLPHGDWWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHDGXOWJHQHUDWLRQDQGHVSHFLDOO\-HVXV¶GLVFLSOHVDQGIROORZHUs²
Luke calls for adult children to separate themselves from the resources and social 
relationships of their kinship family oikos. In terms of Figure 1, these passages critique 
kinship-based firms (i.e., the lower two quadrants). Second, Luke critiques agentic norms and 
behaviors within the conventional first-century oikos. In terms of Figure 1, these passages 
criticize firms who focus on value capture (i.e., the two quadrants on the left-hand side). 
Third, Luke presents a fairly well-deYHORSHGDQDORJLFDOGHVFULSWLRQRI-HVXV¶QHZexemplary 
oikos, which he often describes using language associated with the kingdom of God (i.e., 
which refers to the peculiar managerial character associated with an altruistic God), 
incorporating managerial, inheritance and power-transfer references. In particular, Luke 
promotes a Universal-family form of oikos and describes its hallmark characteristics which 
include: welcoming the marginalized, refusing to lord it over other members or other oikoi, 
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servant leadership norms, and embracing salvific organizational structures and systems. In 
terms of Figure 1, these are hallmarks of Universal-family firms depicted in the fourth 
quadrant. We will present each theme in turn. 
Disbanding the Kinship-Based Organizational Form (Oikos) 
 /XNH¶V&HQWUDO6HFWLRQWDNHVDUDGLFDOVWDQFH²from the perspective of classic Greeks 
and from the first and a twenty-first century²on the matter of family roles in 
transgenerational goods and services producing organizations. Destro and Pesce¶V, p. 
225VWXG\RIIDPLO\DQGKRXVHKROGVLQ/XNH¶V*RVSHOFRQFOXGHs that followers of Jesus were 
called to leave the conventional kinship-based oikos of their parents, just as Jesus and his 
disciples had done. This is an important point for our study, given the position of such adult 
successors-in-waiting within the family-in-business (Aristotle). In each of the five passages in 
the Central Section which address relationships between parents and their adult children, 
Luke describes Jesus directly challenging conventional views of oikos and encouraging adult 
children to leave their kinship oikos behind. For example, a passage near the beginning of the 
Central Section (Luke 9:57-62) describes Jesus telling three small stories, all of which are 
about the need for his followers to leave home and family²their oikos²behind. This passage 
begins with Jesus suggesting that he does not have a traditional oikos: µWKHIR[HVKDYHKROHV
and the birds of the sky have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to lay his head¶ Without 
his own oikos, Jesus cannot serve as a traditional patron for follower-clients, so a traditional 
socio-cultural norm is immediately challenged. In the second and third stories, Jesus is shown 
making quite extreme demands of his would-be followers, refusing them even a farewell to 
their biological families. One young man is told to leave his father unburied, which was more 
unthinkable in the first century than it is today. Given the position of these little vignettes at 
the very opening of the Central Section, it seems clear that Luke is establishing the 
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importance of stepping away from the traditional bonds of oikos, and of the familial ties, 
wealth and honor codes associated with these structures. 
Still more graphic insistence on this theme can be found in three further passages, later 
LQWKH&HQWUDO6HFWLRQZKLFKPDNHFOHDUWKDWIRU/XNH¶V-HVXVthe middle generation should 
forsake their traditional kinship family oikos (Luke 12:51-53; 14:26; 18:29b-30)1: 
³'R\RXWKLQNWKDW,KDYHFRPHWRbring peace to the earth? No, I tell you, but rather 
division! From now on five in one household will be divided, three against two and 
two against three; they will be divided: father against son and son against father, 
mother against daughter and daughter against mother, mother-in-law against her 
daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law against mother-in-ODZ´/XNH-53)  
³:KRHYHUFRPHVWRPHDQGGRHVQRWKDWH>WKDWLVVHSDUDWHWKHPVHOYHVIURP@IDWKHU
and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, cannot be 
P\GLVFLSOH´/XNH 
³7UXO\,WHOO\RXWKHUHLVQRRQHZKRKDVOHIWKRXVHRUZLIHRUEURWKHUVRUSDUHQWVRU
children, for the sake of the kingdom of God, who will not get back very much more 
LQWKLVDJHDQGLQWKHDJHWRFRPHHWHUQDOOLIH´/XNHE-30) 
These passages would seem very harsh and offensive if they were not understood as part of 
/XNH¶VUHFXUULQJWKHPHthat challenges conventional family oikos structures and systems. The 
verses are not an attack on the people that comprise RQH¶Vkinship family, but rather they are a 
part of encouraging listeners to consider non-kinship structures and systems for providing 
goods and services, especially in light of the cultic oikos of the new kingdom of God. 
Jesus himself models this by exiting from his own birth oikos; Jesus does not take 
over as the head of his kinship famil\¶Voikos, but instead becomes an itinerant preacher. 
Moreover, Jesus distances himself further from his biological family when, in response to a 
woman who shouts out blessings on his birth mother, Jesus says: ³%OHVVHGUDWKHUDUHWKRVH
ZKRKHDUWKHZRUGRI*RGDQGREH\LW´/XNH-28). Earlier, in a similar situation, Jesus 
points to a universal family when he VD\V³My mother and my brothers are those who hear 
                                                 
1
 Note that all biblical quotes in this paper are taken from the New Revised Standard Version 
(e.g., Metzger & Murphy, 1991). 
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WKHZRUGRI*RGDQGGRLW´/XNH Again, the cultic universal family oikos is given 
precedence over a traditional kinship family-in-business understanding. 
In terms of Figure 1, this theme seems to suggest that there is no inherent value in the 
conventional kinship-based family firm per se (i.e., the lower two quadrants). As will be 
evident in the next theme, this is especially true regarding the value-capturing nature of 
conventional kinship-based oikos forms. 
Denunciating a Conventional Value-Capture-Focused Organizational Form (Oikos) 
The Central Section is filled with passages that identify shortcomings of conventional  
value-capturing oikos practices. Most of these have some variation of the theme: a primary 
focus on the financial well-being of your kinship oikos is hollow, disrupts relationships 
DPRQJVRFLHW\¶V oikoi, and may contribute to the poverty and marginalization of others, 
especially those who themselves have been excluded from membership in a kinship oikos. For 
example, when Jesus is asked to intervene to ensure that a grown child receive his proper 
(kinship) oikos inheritance (Luke 12:13), he responds by telling the parable of the Rich Fool 
(Luke 12:16-17), which describes a self-congratulatory wealthy landowner who has a good 
harvest and decides he will build even more barns to store his assets. That same night he dies 
and God calls him a fool, asking whom all these goods belong to now. (FKRLQJ$ULVWRWOH¶V
views on living only versus living well, this parable teaches listeners not to be concerned by 
maximizing how much financial wealth they will get from their oikos²³IRURQH¶VOLIHGRHV
QRWFRQVLVWLQWKHDEXQGDQFHRISRVVHVVLRQV´²but rather to be concerned about living a 
genuinely good life (see also Luke 17:26-31). 
Perhaps the most famous passage on this topic is the Parable of the ten pounds (Luke 
19:11-26), which describes a nobleman asking three of his managers to use his riches to make 
more money. One manager refuses to do so and is punished, while two managers double their 
PDVWHU¶VZHDOWKDQGDUHUHZDUGHG:KHUHDVWKHYHU\HDUOLHVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKLVSDVVDJH
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UHFRJQL]HWKHWKLUGPDQDJHUDVWKH³KHUR´KHUHIXVHGWRXVHPRQey to widen the gap between 
rich and poor), many contemporary interpretations suggest the managers who doubled their 
PDVWHU¶VZHDOWKDUHWKHRQHVWRHPXODWHIRUDPRUHGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKLVFRQWHVWHGSDUDEOH
see Dyck, 2013, and Dyck, Starke, & Dueck, 2009). A less ambiguous teaching about 
acquisitive economic behavior is found in Luke 17:10, where Jesus explicitly instructs 
listeners that oikos members should do not be profit-seeking (achreioi).  
Jesus elaborates on this theme in the subsequent verses²WKHFHOHEUDWHG³/LOOLHVRIWKH
ILHOG´WHDFKLQJ, which point to the folly of conspicuous consumption, materialism and 
greed²arJXLQJWKDW³OLIHLVPRUHWKDQIRRGDQGWKHERG\PRUHWKDQFORWKHV´/XNH-
34). Listeners are told to give away their possessions, and instead to SXUVXH³DWUHDVXUHLQ
KHDYHQWKDWZLOOQHYHUIDLO«IRUZKHUH\RXUWUHDVXUHLVWKHUH\RXUKHDUWZLOOEHDOVR´7KHVH
verses criticize both an attachment to the trappings of wealth (especially those which signal 
status) and the deliberate and conscious pursuit of such trappings (see also Luke 16:19-31).  
 Consider also the Parable of the great feast (Luke 14:15-24), where the first guests 
who had been invited all reply that they cannot attend, due to specific domestic conventional 
oikos-related responsibilities: one invitee has just bought a new plot of land, another has 
invested in five new pairs of oxen, and a third has just married. All three prefer to focus on 
their immediate material oikos interests, in which they have just made investments (Destro & 
Pesce, 2003, p. 230). In this case, the host responds in a counter-cultural (stewardship) 
manner by inviting people from the margins of society²the poor, the crippled, beggars, and 
other marginalised people²so that his oikos may be full for the feast. These guests have 
nothing to offer; their very low status in society means that even any honor they attribute to 
the benefactor who is inviting them will not improve the honor status of the host (Neyrey & 
Stewart, 2008). Indeed, according to Luke the host is happy (blessed) precisely because they 
cannot repay him (cf. Luke 14:14; no value capture). 
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Finally, when it comes to teachings about chrematistics more generally, it is clear that 
Luke is particularly concerned about the accumulation of large amounts of wealth (recall that 
in that time the financial economy was seen to be a fixed pie, where increasing wealth for one 
oikos meant reduced wealth for others). Of the 18 passages in Luke that deal with money, 
nine passages mention the word rich, and nine do not. In each of the nine passages that refer 
to the rich (and thus signal a focus on value capture/acquisitive economics), Luke calls for the 
redistribution of wealth, typically calling for the rich to sell their possessions and give money 
to the poor (Dyck, 2013). In contrast, in each of the other nine passages money is seen as a  
part of everyday life (sustenance economics, or natural chrematistics, in $ULVWRWOH¶VWHUPV). 
Taken together, in terms of Figure 1, the passages in this theme deplore practices that 
emphasize value capture more than value creation, regardless of their level of analysis. This 
brings us to the final theme and its sub-sections. 
Hallmarks of a Universal-Family Organizational From (Oikos) 
Beyond critiquing conventional kinship-based oikos structures and systems, the 
Central Section also points to an alternative understanding of oikos that is closely associated 
with the fourth quadrant in Figure 1. In Luke this organizational ideal-type is described using 
language that suggests that oikoi are to be managed using the same non-conventional 
approach exemplified by God, denoted as ³WKHNLQJGRPRI*RG´Indeed, virtually all of the 
examples in Luke of what the kingdom of God look like, and how it can be enacted, take 
place in an oikos setting (Dyck, 2013). For example, in the only passage where Jesus says 
³7KHNLQJGRPRI*RGLVOLNH«´KHGHVFULEHVLWDVEHLQJHPEHGGHGLQoikos settings: the 
kingdom of God is like a farmer who plants a mustard seed in his garden in order to provide a 
perch for the birds; it is like a baker who adds yeast to her large batch of dough (Luke 13:18-
21; see also 14:28-33). Note also how both of these descriptions hint at the counter-cultural 
nature of the kingdom of God: rabbinic tradition forbade the sowing of mustard because it 
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was a weed (Oakman, 1986, p. 124), and yeast was seen as a symbol of corruption whereas 
unleaven stood for what is holy (Longenecker, 2000, p. 141). 
-HVXV¶FRXQWHU-cultural understanding of oikos is front-and-center in two well-known 
twin passages in the Central Section, each of which starts with Jesus being asked what people 
FDQGRWR³LQKHULW´DTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWZDy of life (Luke 10:25-37; 18:18-25). In each 
passage Jesus is asked by a member of the conventional elite (first a lawyer, then a rich young 
UXOHUZKDWWKH\PXVWGRWR³LQKHULWHWHUQDOOLIH´7KLVSKUDVHLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWKH
question of inheritance is clearly of interest to people interested in the family firm, and 
EHFDXVH³HWHUQDOOLIH´UHIHUVto a new era characterized by the fullness of living that is 
FRPSOHWHLQLWVHOILQWKHILUVWFHQWXU\WKHUHZDVQRVHQVHWKDW³HWHUQDO´OLIHPHDQW³HQGOHVV´
life [Hanson, 1875]). Thus, in these passages members of the social elite are essentially 
asking about how to belong to the (counter-cultural) oikos of God, and how to achieve a fuller 
life than they have at the apex of a status quo experience of oikos. In the first passage Jesus 
tells his listeners to love God, and to love their (non-kin) neighbors as they love themselves. 
In other words, do not see your neighbor as a potential client to be lorded over (agentic view), 
but rather as a potential sibling to share with (stewardship/value creation view). This is 
elaborated upon by the story of the Good Samaritan where a travelling merchant, with no 
thought of benefitting from it himself, helps a stranger. In the second passage, when a rich 
ruler explains that he has brought honor to his familial oikos for his entire life, Jesus says: 
µ6HOODOOWKDW\RXRZQDQGGLVWULEXWHWKHPRQH\WRWKHSRRU [a simple form of value creation]¶
(Luke 18:22), thereby breaking the conventional understanding of what it meant to honor 
RQH¶V kinship oikos. In sum, these two passages describe counter-cultural practices associated 
with living well according to structures and systems consistent with the kingdom of God, and 
suggest that these practices are modelled by an altruistic God from whom they are in some 
way inherited.  
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 Taken together, the Universal-family oikoi described in Luke can be seen to follow 
four hallmark principles: (1) include the marginalized; (2) practice benefaction rather than 
patronage; (3) exemplify servant leadership; and (4) enact salvific organizational practices. 
 1. Include the Marginalized  (e.g., welcome people who do not belong to an oikos). 
Unlike conventional oikoi/XNH¶V-HVXVrepeatedly insists that the resources of the oikos be 
extended to benefit the most marginalized members of the surrounding society (and especially 
to the ten percent of the population who currently to do not belong to any oikos). This is 
evident in the story of the Good Samaritan who helps the literal outcast, and in the story of the 
householder who invites WRKLVIHDVW³WKHSRRUWKHFULSSOHGWKHODPHWKHEOLQG´IURPZKRP
he will never receive any form of direct recompense (Luke 14:12-14, see also Destro & Pesce, 
2003, pp. 231-2). It is especially evident in the new model oikos, the cultic community of the 
NLQJGRPRI*RGZKHUH³SHRSOHZLOOFRPHIURPHDVWDQGZHVWDQGQRUWKDQGVRXWKDQGZLOO
take their places at the feast in the kingdom of God. Indeed there are those who are last who 
ZLOOEHILUVWDQGILUVWZKRZLOOEHODVW´/XNH-30; see also Luke 14:15-24). The need to 
move beyond calculative, quid pro quo accumulation of social capital and exchange of favors 
is made very clearly indeed. Instead, the resources of the oikos are to be used to nurture the 
marginalized, the outsiders, with no hope or desire for payback.   
2. Practice Benefaction rather than Patronage. In terms of relationships with other 
oikoi, the universal family oikos described in Luke refuses to have clients. Luke repeatedly 
and explicitly condemns people who pursue their debtors, whilst recommending open-handed 
(value creating) generosity as an alternative (e.g., Luke 11:5-13). One of the many socio-
economic roles of patron-householders was the provision of financial loans to their clients 
(Moxnes, 1988, 1991). In an era well before banking, clearly this was a function of no small 
importance (value creation), but it also served to create ties based on financial inequalities, 
and potentially provided a (value capturing) vehicle for the rich to eventually seize the assets 
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of indebted poor. In Luke Jesus repeatedly presents the forgiveness of debts in a positive 
light, and the suing of debtors in a very negative one. For e[DPSOHWKH/RUG¶V3UD\HUKDVWKH
IDPRXVOLQHDERXW³IRUJLYLQJWKHLQGHEWHG´/XNHWKH*UHHNZRUGVFOHDUO\WDONDERXW
financial debt) just as God is asked to forgive sins. Similarly, Jesus criticizes a lawyer for 
burdening the poor with debt, and doing nothing to help those labouring under indebtedness 
(Luke 11:27-28), and uses the example of someone suing a debtor to show that listeners fail to 
see the moral faults in their own behavior (Luke 12:57-59). Another well-known example is 
when the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) uses his money to help a literal social outcast with 
no thought of creating indebtedness, an act of benevolence that extended far beyond the 
stakeholders of his oikos. 7KHSDUDEOHHQGVZLWK-HVXVVD\LQJ³*RDQGGROLNHZLVH´ A final 
example is in the Parable of the shrewd manager, which ends with a rich man commending 
his manager for using oikos resources to decrease the gap between rich and poor (Luke 16:1-
13; for a more detailed analysis of this contested passage, see Dyck et al., 2006). Taken 
together, these passages describe organizations where resources are used to enhance value 
creation rather than value capture (e.g., deliberately refuse to exploit others), and where 
agents act on behalf of the larger community rather tKDQLQWKHLURZQWKHLUSULQFLSDO¶V
financial self-interests.  
3. Exemplifying Servant Leadership. Jesus is legendary for servant leadership acts 
like washing the feet of his disciples and for sayings like: 
³7KHNLQJVRIWKH*HQWLOHVORUGLWRYHU>kurieuousin, to rule over, dominate] them; and 
those in authority over them are called benefactors. But not so with you; rather the 
greatest among you must become like the youngest, and the leader [hegoumenos2] like 
one who serves. For who is greater, the one who is at the table or the one who serves? 
,VLWQRWWKHRQHDWWKHWDEOH"%XW,DPDPRQJ\RXDVRQHZKRVHUYHV´/XNH5b-
26). 
 
                                                 
2
 ³7KH*UHHNZRUGFKRLFHIRUOHDGHULQWKLVSDVVDJHhegoumenos, which appears only in this 
verse in all of Luke) points to the distinctive feature of the kind of leadership Jesus wants his 
disciples to aspire to²it is a leadership that deliberately considers the views of others and 
does not lord it over others.´'\FNS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Consistent with this, the Central Section has several passages that challenge and 
undermine the conventional social structures and systems regarding how people treat one 
another within the oikos (e.g., the Parable of the prodigal son, Luke 15:11-32). A particularly 
relevant passage describes a counter-cultural oikos where the master adopts the role of the 
lowliest of slaves when he serves oikos members (Luke 12:35-40). By lauding households 
where leaders freely chose to subordinate their own authority and power to serve the needs of 
other household members, such passages contrast strongly with conventional norms, and 
point to a counter-cultural oikos associated with kingdom of God. Jesus describes his disciples 
as stewards within such a universal family cultic oikos, where everyone, including slaves, are 
treated with dignity and respect as though they were brothers and sisters (Luke 12:41-48).   
4. Enacting Salvific Practices. We believe that the Zaccheaus story is the most 
noteworthy description in the Central Section of an oikos that embraces salvific organizational 
structures and systems (Luke 19:1-10). Here we refer to first-century understandings of 
salvation, which had two meanings. For the Jews salvation meant escaping from oppressive 
structures and systems, such as living under the thumb of their oppressive Roman overseers. 
For Greco-Romans, it referred to the bestowal of new blessings, such as new structures and 
systems that enable positive change (e.g., ironically, they describe the Roman emperor as a 
Savior thanks to his ushering in Pax Romana) (Powell, 1992).  
The story of Zaccheaus describes Jesus entering the oikos of a rich chief tax-collector 
QDPHG=DFFKHDXVWRWKHVKRFNRIVRPHLQ-HVXV¶ZLGHUHQWRXUDJHVLQFH-HVXVLVWKHUHE\
giving social status to someone widely considered to a corrupt outsider. In response:  
³=DFFKHDXVVWRRGWKHUHDQGVDLGWRWKH/RUGµ/RRN half of my possessions, Lord, I 
will give to the poor; and if I have defrauded anyone of anything, I will pay back four 
WLPHVDVPXFK¶7KHQ-HVXVVDLGWRKLPµ7RGD\VDOYDWLRQKDVFRPHWRWKLVKRXVH 
[oikos], because he too is a son of Abraham. For the Son of Man came to seek out and 
WRVDYHWKHORVW¶´/XNH-10) 
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Much like the shrewd manager WKHRQO\RWKHU³ULFK´oikos in Luke that is commended 
by Jesus), Zacchaeus begins to share his riches to decrease the gap between rich and poor, 
enacting specific oikos practices that facilitate salvation (money to the poor, redemptive 
business practices). This is the only passage in Luke where Jesus uses the noun ³salvation´ 
thereby drawing further attention to the importance of how goods and services producing 
organizations are managed. The story describes salvific structures and systems that both 
reduce oppression associated with the status quo (e.g., Zacchaeus abandons conventional 
value capture norms) and foster positive change (benefaction and justice extending beyond 
the stakeholders of the oikos). As in the case of the shrewd manager, =DFFKDHXV¶Vscattering 
of resources does not result in the collapse of the focal oikos (i.e., not all the oikos resources 
are dispersed).   
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis indicates that the Gospel of Luke, particularly in its Central Section, has 
much to say about issues related to the modern idea of family business, especially with regard 
to agency and stewardship. In particular, our analysis of Luke challenges the romanticized 
idealistic image of the kinship family business as a timeless example of an inherently 
exemplary or virtuous organizational form. Luke consistently criticizes organizational forms 
where authority and wealth are transferred via kinship lines from one generation to the next, 
which Luke associates with a perpetuation of social inequities. In their place, Luke promotes 
Universal-family oikoi where everyone is treated as a sister or a brother, with a special 
invitation for people who previously were excluded from membership in goods and services 
producing organizations. To be clear, Luke does not reject the idea or downplay the 
importance of family firms; quite the opposite, Luke sees Universal-family firms as central 
for instantiating the kingdom of God and salvation. Thus, whilst a halo of goodness is still 
ascribed to the family firm form, the root cause of this goodness is grounded in only some 
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features of the kinship family firm (e.g., caring for other members beyond value-capturing 
instrumental reasons), and in steadfastly rejecting other features (e.g., refusing to perpetuate 
power and ownership differences based on kinship).  
OXUUHPDLQLQJGLVFXVVLRQZLOOIRFXVRQRXUVWXG\¶VWKHRUHWLFDOFRQWULEXWLRQVDQG 
implications for research. In particular, we will: 1) demonstrate that the idea of a Universal-
family firm is observable and credible, and thus merits future study; 2) identify specific 
implications of our study for the contemporary agency-stewardship literature in family firms;  
and 3) discuss implications of Universal-family firms for researchers in family business.  
Empirical Examples of Universal-Family Firms: Early Church and Contemporary3  
The Universal-family firm is not simply an abstract ideal-type relegated to ideas and 
values promoted in an ancient manuscript. Rather, glimpses of it are apparent in historical as 
well as contemporary organizations, providing further credibility to this phenomenon and a 
solid basis for future research and theoretical development (Reay & Whetton, 2011).  
Early Church. *LYHQWKDWRXUDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDW/XNH¶V-HVXVSURPRWHGDQG
modeled a Universal-family oikos, it should not be surprising that his followers in the early 
Church sought to put this into practice. Hallmarks of the Universal-family oikos are evident 
from the very beginning of the movement that would become Christianity, which was known 
for decreasing the gap between rich and poor, practicing inclusiveness beyond kinship groups, 
sharing economic and material assets, and providing special care for the marginalized and 
outcasts (e.g., Countryman, 1980; Gotsis & Drakopoulou Dodd, 2004; Malina, 2001; 
Troeltsch, 1931). Early followers are presented as a Universal-family oikos whose members:  
³would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to all, as any had 
need. Day by day, as they spent much time together in the temple, they broke bread at 
home [oikos] and ate their food with glad and generous hearts, praising God and 
having the goodwill of all the people´ (Acts 2:45-47; see also Acts 4:32-34). 
 
                                                 
3
 2XUWKDQNVDUHGXHWRWZRDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVZKRSURSRVHGWKDWH[HPSODUVRI³/XFDQ´
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The reference in this passage to breaking bread together in their oikos refers to sharing 
communion/eucharist, which was part of everyday meals in the early Church. This practice 
was widely noted by commentators in that time because it drew attention to the lack of status 
differentials within the new oikoi RI-HVXV¶IROORZHUVLQVWDUNFRQWUDVWWRWKHQRUPVRIWKHGD\
where a master would never eat alongside a slave (note that the etymology of the word 
company, today often used interchangeably with a business, means literally to share bread 
together, Hopfl, 2000, p. 316). Acts goes on to describe how this new movement spread from 
one oikos WRDQRWKHU³KRXVHWRKRXVH´VHH$FWV, as observers are attracted to its 
distinct practices. Aspects of the Universal-family oikos are also evident in the nascent 
monastic movement (Gordon, 1989, pp. 10-11, 18), and are especially well-exemplified in the 
extensive social enterprise provision established in Cappadocian Caesarea by Basil the Great 
(330-379 AD, see Karayiannis & Drakopoulou Dodd, 1998, p. 188). 
Contemporary examples. Although not very prominent in the business literature, there 
are nevertheless many glimpses of the Universal-family firm archetype in contemporary 
practice. Just as in the biblical record, many of these exemplary organizations may not be 
comprised of people who claim to follow Jesus (e.g., Luke 7:9; 10:37; 19:9). That said, here 
we will briefly highlight a group of contemporary businesses where the link to gospel 
teachings are appropriately ³WUDQVSDUHQWO\REVHUYDEOH´(LVHQKDUGW, namely the more 
than 800 firms from 50 countries who belong to the Economy of Communion (EOC) that is 
part of the Focolare movement within the Catholic church. EOC firms are rooted in principles 
associate with the Universal-family firm:  
³the spirituality of the Focolare stems from the principle that all people are equal 
members of the one human family²sons and daughters of the one Creator²and 
therefore have to be treated as brothers and sisters.  ... Achieving such relationships, 
in view of establishing one human family, becomes the main motivating force in every 
action´(Gold, 2010, p. 128-29; emphases added here). 
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EOC firms have found it challenging to apply this family mentality in the public 
marketplace, for example, when many members of the firm may not be fellow believers; 
³there are profound challenges to such a system if it is to retain this specific characteristic of 
intimacy and to operate within the legal, institutional and political framework of the market 
economy´(Gold, 2010, p. 195). Key practices instituted by owner-managers help to address 
such challenges, perhaps most notably their voluntary implementation of EOC programs to 
share firm profits QRWHWKHVLPLODULW\WR=DFFKHDXV¶VVWRU\ZKLFKVHUYHVWRLQFOXGHRWKHU
members in a universal family even if they have not consciously opted in. The EOC principle 
of profit-sharing divides a fiUP¶VSURILWVLQWRWKUHHHTXDOSDUWVWKHILUVWLVNHSWWRUHLQYHVWLQ
the firm, the second is sent to a central EOC-related office where decisions are made about 
where to redistribute it to poor people around the world, and the third is invested in 
developing educational endeavors that promote a culture of giving.   
Research among EOC firms suggests that, over time, they tend to increasingly: adopt a 
long-term orientation; engage in participative decision-making; recruit and hire people living 
on the margins of society; reduce pay differentials within the firm; and create value beyond 
the financial realm and beyond the borders of the firm¶s stakeholders (e.g., EOC firms are 
more likely to internalize externalities by, for example, proactively paying extra costs to 
enhance environmentally-friendly inputs and practices). They treat even competitors and other 
non-stakeholders as brothers and sisters (see Gold, 2010, p. 145, and Mundell, 2011, pp. 7-8, 
for exemplary stories of managers in EOC firms). GallagKHUDQG%XFNH\H¶VDQDO\VLV 
VXJJHVWVWKDW(2&ILUPVHQDFW³VWUXFWXUHVRIJUDFH´DQGSURPRWHEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHVDLPHGDW
fostering unity²DLPHG³QRWDWHFRQRPLFHIILFLHQF\>traditional issues associated with agency 
theory] or social legitimacy [associated with stewardship issues], or even the inculcation of 
YLUWXH´²and thus provides an appropriate segue into our next section.   
Implications for Stewardship and Agency Research 
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 Our study makes important contributions to the agency and stewardship literature 
within family firms, both by focusing attention on the differences portrayed in the four 
organizational ideal-types depicted in Figure 1, and more generally by introducing the 
Universal-family firm ideal-type which theories can explain and make predictions about. 
Implications arising from the four-fold organizational typology. Our study is 
consistent with and helps to clarify recent research that suggests that, although stewardship 
theory and agency theory may appear at be odds, support for both can be found under 
different circumstances (Le-Breton-Miller et al., 2011). For example, predictions based on 
agency theories may be more relevant for firms in the left-hand quadrants of Figure 1, and 
predictions based on stewardship theory more relevant for firms in the two right-hand 
quadrants. Thus our framework is consistent with the idea that there are (at least) two kinds of 
kinship family firms, those beholden to agency theory where dominant kinship-centric 
interests may XQGHUPLQHWKHILUP¶VILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHAgentic family firms), and those 
consistent with stewardship theory where concern for holistic needs of stakeholders 
FRPSOHPHQWDILUP¶VIRFXVRQQDUURZILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHStewardship family firms). 
 By invoking the ideas of value creation versus value capture, our study provides new 
concepts for future research in agency versus stewardship theory. The overlap between 
agency and value capture enables teasing out differences across levels of analysis within 
agency theory. For example, agency theory predicts that kinship firms generally (quadrants 2 
and 3) will enjoy relative advantages compared to Conventional firms (quadrant 1) at the 
interface between owners and managers (reduced monitoring costs), but at the same time 
agency theory also predicts that Agentic family firms (quadrant 2) will have relative 
disadvantages due to their tendency to sub-optimally distribute resources within the firm (e.g., 
family-based parochialism). The first case uses agency theory to explain why kinship firms 
efficiently capture value in the marketplace, whereas the second uses agency theory to explain 
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why dominant families within kinship firms may capture disproportionate shares of the value 
created by their firm. The distinction between value capture versus value creation may help to 
explain why some Stewardship family firms (quadrant 3) are able to avoid the dysfunctional 
aspects predicted by agency theory associated with Agentic family firms (quadrant 2). This 
draws helpful attention to the often-ORRNHG³SULQFLSDO´LQWKHSULQFLSDO-agent relationship, and 
leads to the following hypothesis: When principals are more interested in value creation than 
in value capture, then the negative parochialism predicted by agency theory is overcome. 
Future researchers can examine a variety of reasons why principals may be more interested in 
value creation than value capture (e.g., values of founders, economic conditions at founding).  
As with the overlap between agency and value capture, the overlap between 
stewardship and value creation also enables deepened understanding across levels of analysis. 
For example, future research may use stewardship theory to examine why Universal-family 
firms focus on creating value at a community-wide level of analysis (e.g., concerns for 
marginalized people of society), whereas Stewardship family firms focus on creating value 
among their stakeholders. We expect that such theory development may involve further fine-
tuning of five factors identified in the beginning of our paper that help to explain why family 
firms are more likely to act like stewards. For example, Stewardship and Universal-family 
firms may both emphasize valuing relationships, but future research may want to examine 
whether Universal- (versus Stewardship) family firms tend to place greater emphasis on 
identity (versus reputation) and a long-term commitment to the larger community (versus a 
long-term commitment to the firm).  
 Implications for Universal-family research. In addition to using agency and 
stewardship theories to explain differences between the four organizational types depicted in 
Figure 1, we suggest that future agency/stewardship research can also focus more narrowly on 
the Universal-family firm ideal-type itself. Toward this end, in so far as agency theory is able 
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to examine how well the behavior of agents (managers) aligns with the interests of principals 
(owners), it has much to offer students of Universal-family firms. However, as has been 
VXJJHVWHGDERYHWKH³SULQFLSDOV´RI8QLYHUVDO-family firms are unlike those considered in 
traditional agency theory. Rather than have a primary emphasis on maximizing financial 
wealth, or on preserving the instrumental interests of a particular kinship family, the 
principals of Universal-family firms are concerned with developing financially-viable goods 
and service producing organizations that enhance community-wide well-being, and especially 
the marginalized. This FRPSULVHVSULQFLSDO¶V self-interests. The task of agency theory, then, is 
to explain and predict factors that increase the likelihood that agents will enact such 
SULQFLSDOV¶SULQFLSOHVOf course, this can be expected to turn some of the conventional 
practices associated with agency theory on their head. For example, instead of having 
principals monitor agents, agency theory might predict that the performance of Universal-
family firm agents will be optimized if agents monitor and become attuned to the needs of the 
marginalized. In a sense, the Universal-family firm inverts the so-called agency problem: 
$JHQWVDQGSULQFLSDOVZKRKDYHILUVWKDQGNQRZOHGJHRIWKHLUHPSOR\HHVDQGFRPPXQLW\¶V
needs will be more likely to act on them rather than merely pursue their personal financial 
interests (consistent with logic of social embeddedness, Le Bretton-Miller et al., 2011). Along 
the same lines, when applied to Universal-family firms, agency theory might predict 
improved overlap between the interests of principals and agents when principals see 
themselves as members of the firms rather than as investors in it. 
Similarly, in so far as stewardship theory is able to examine how generous firm 
members are and how well they serve the larger community (apart from maximizing their 
own financial performance), it also has much to offer students of Universal-family firms. In 
particular, our framework draws attention to using stewardship theory to examine Universal-
family firms along two distinct dimensions: 1) their proclivity to share the fruits of their value 
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capture (e.g., via philanthropy), and 2) their proclivity to engage in value creation activities 
that serve the larger community without necessarily optimizing the financial return for the 
firm (e.g., hiring the marginalized, social entrepreneurship). We would expect relatively high 
emphasis on value creation activities, which are more counter-cultural and lie closer to the 
core of the Universal-family firm identity. Stewardship theory may also lead to research to 
test whether Universal-family firms tend to have a more diverse membership (reflecting the 
diversity of the community they are embedded in).  
Taken together, our analysis suggests that agency theory and stewardship theory may 
not be in such opposition after all: Universal-family firms provide an occasion for them to be 
used in complementary ways. Building on a similar observation by Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller (2009), it may be that their apparent opposition is more a function of the conventional 
social systems that scholars and practitioners are embedded within, namely the taken-for-
granted assumptions that SULQFLSDOV¶VHOI-interests involve financial wealth maximization and 
that kinship families are the primary social unit towards achieve self-actualized socio-
emotional well-being. Indeed, these conventional assumptions are entirely consistent with the 
materialistic-individualistic ³iron cage´ that Weber (1958, p. 182) identified more than a 
century ago, which KHVXJJHVWHGFRXOGEHEHVWHVFDSHGYLD³HQWLUHO\QHZSURSKHWV´RU³WKH
rebirth of old ideas and ideals.´We suspect that Weber would have welcomed, and not have 
been surprised by, our findings that the Gospel of Luke has embedded within it a description 
of an organizational form that has potential to liberate members (and theories) from the iron 
cage.  
Universal-Family Firms  
 Our presentation of Universal-family firms should be of great interest to family 
EXVLQHVVVFKRODUVEHFDXVHRIKRZWKLVGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHTXHVWLRQRI³:KDWLVLW"´WKDWLV
being studied (Reay & :KHWWRQS,QSDUWLFXODUZHDVN³:KDWLVIDPLO\EXVLQHVV
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EH\RQGELRORJLFDONLQVKLSUHODWLRQVKLSV"´7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUniversal-family firms 
versus kinship family firms (and/or Conventional firms) invites and compels family business 
scholars to examine hallmarks of family-ness beyond biological relations. This is no easy 
task, but tackling it promises to bear fruit in terms of richer conceptual and theory 
development in the literature. Note that such reconstruction of the meaning of family²
namely, for it to have more of a sociological than a biological meaning²is entirely consistent 
with the changing meaning of family in society at large (e.g., blended families, homosexual 
marriage and parenting, and so on) (Braithwaite et al., 2010; Marcianna & Sussman, 1991).  
In addition to identifying some implications of the Universal-family firm for  
researchers in family business (e.g., need to go beyond biological definitions, implications for 
stewardship and agency theory), our paper also addresses each of the other four components 
associated with developing a theoretical contribution to family business research (Reay & 
Whetton, 2011, p. 107). In particular, our paper demonstrates that the idea of a Universal-
family firm is observable and credible (e.g., evident in descriptions of practices associated 
within the first century Early Church and the twenty-first century Economy of Communion 
movement), and describes key factors associated with Universal-family firms and how these 
factors are related to each other (inclusivity of the marginalized, benefaction that counters 
patron-client relations, servant leadership that treats everyone with dignity, and embracement 
of liberating organizational practices). Finally, in terms of identifying possible antecedents 
and conditions associated with Universal-family firms²which may range from the personal 
beliefs and practices of organizational members, to structural characteristics of who comprises 
an organization, to what variety of capitalism a firm is operating in²we suggest that 
Universal-family firms are more likely to be evident when: members are open to the idea of 
DQDOWUXLVWLF*RGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH³WKHRORJLFDOWXUQ´6LPPRQV; members practice 
spiritual disciplines (Dyck, 2014); firms are not dominated by one biological family (Le 
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Breton-Miller, Miller & Lester, 2011, p. 717); managers do not serve (only) one biological 
family (Miller et al., 2014); and firms operate in a coordinated rather than a liberal market 
economy (Carnevale & Mazzuca, 2014).  
Finally, beyond its conceptual and theoretical contributions, our focus on Universal-
family firms is also important for practical reasons. For example, because of their unique 
emphasis on community-wide value creation, Universal-family firms may provide greater 
benefits to society-at-large than kinship family firms. Indeed, the key themes found in Luke 
with regards to Universal-family firms have a timely and timeless quality to them. The themes 
of sustenance economics, decreasing the gap between rich and poor, and treating everyone 
with dignity are entirely relevant in our world of Occupy Wall Street and its concerns 
regarding social justice, sweat shops, and the negative effects that result when financial well-
being out-trumps all other forms of well-being (e.g., ecological, spiritual, social, physical, 
SV\FKRORJLFDOHWF/XNH¶VLPSOLFLWK\SRWKHVLVLVWKDWWKH8QLYHUVDO-family firm would 
optimize value creation and community-wide stewardship, and minimize negative aspects 
associated with an over-emphasis on (financial) value capture and the financially self-
interested assumptions associated with agency theory.  
Conclusion  
 Our study has demonstrated the merit in analyzing historical texts in their socio-
economic context and drawing insights for contemporary family business research. We 
encourage other scholars to use similar methods to contribute to theory-development. In 
particular, our study of the Gospel of Luke provides welcome opportunities for contemporary 
scholars to (re)consider the socio-psychological core of what constitutes the hallmarks of a 
family business. Rather than define family firms in biological kinship terms, a focus on 
Universal-family firms draws attention to sociological and psychological characteristics. This 
seems a richer and more promising vein of theoretical and empirical research, and permits 
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researchers who wish to study firms that exhibit attributes such as those described in Luke to 
escape from the hand-cuffs of familial kinship. Of course, this liberation may also be off-
putting to some, because it threatens the biological core identity of the family business 
research, and also de-emphasizes the mainstream interest in value capture and profit 
maximization. But if the theory and research related to family firms cannot stand on its own 
without a biological kinship connection and a primary focus on financial well-being, then 
perhaps cutting the umbilical cord is long overdue.   
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Figure 1:  Four organizational ideal types 
   ________________________________________________ 
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   |_______________________ |_______________________ | 
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Kinship Firms  |  2. Agentic family firms |  3. Stewardship family firms | 
  |    |    | 
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